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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores whether increased competition in the selection process of 
military officers leads to higher-quality officers being chosen. Using the universe of Marine 
Corps officer applicants from 2009–2017, I estimate the relationship between the quality 
of selected officers and the ratio of selected officers to the pool of candidates. I first 
document that there is significant variation of selection ratios across Officer Candidate 
Course (OCC) and Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) officer selection boards, with most of 
the variation being across years. I next estimate regression models of the impact of 
selection ratio on quality, where quality is proxied by Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) 
and Grade Point Average (GPA) scores. The estimated correlation between selection ratio 
and quality is negative and significant when including fixed effects for year, component, 
geographic location, and demographic components. The negative relationship suggests that 
a lower selection ratio is a signal of a more competitive board, and the board members are 
able to choose officers of higher academic quality. 
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Using data derived from Marine Corps Recruiting Command officer recruiting 
records, I estimate the effects selection ratio has on selected officer quality across the 
Officer Candidate Course (OCC) and Platoon Leaders Course (PLC) commissioning 
programs. Specifically, I examine applicant selection ratio differences and whether these 
differences correspond to changes in the quality of applicants. Testing the null hypothesis 
that lower selection ratio and higher selected officer quality are independent, the evidence 
strongly suggests rejecting the null. The results of this study suggest first that variation 
exists in selection ratios between selection boards and air contracts but most notably varies 
with the change in years. Second, the results show that selection ratio on quality estimates 
are negative and significant when fixed effects for year, component, geographic location, 
and demographic components are added. This study seeks to determine if variation exists 
on officer selection boards and how much effect selection ratio has on the quality of 
selected Marine officers.  
The Marine Corps uses multiple commissioning source programs, two of which—
OCC and PLC—make up almost 75 percent of officer accessions (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 2015). These two programs conduct 
selection boards at the district and region levels in order to determine the best qualified 
applicants for selection in the officer corps. While both are commissioning source 
programs, these programs focus on different populations of eligible candidates and each 
program has a different contact-to-commission timeline. However, selecting high-quality 
applicants remains the area of utmost importance. Enlisted Recruiters utilize the armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a metric to attain their quota of high-quality 
enlistments, as well as for Recruiting Station (RS) commands to access recruiter 
performance (Dertouzos, 1985). Officer quality metrics focus on Scholastic Assessment 
Test (SAT) and Grade Point Average (GPA) scores as quality indicators on selection board, 
and they are the only available variables from which to draw comparisons and conclusions. 
Though there are numerous other factors considered during the selection process, this study 
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focuses on two aspects of officer selection, variation on competitive boards and the effect 
competition has on quality.   
One cannot overstate the importance of ensuring that recruiting efforts and overall 
military personnel composition represent the country’s population. For this reason, 
recruiters are missioned for contracts throughout the nation with the goal of ensuring 
applicants from all over the nation are submitted for officer selection consideration. 
Recruiter performance remains a key aspect of obtaining applicants and helps provide 
selection boards with high-quality applicants for consideration. Numerous studies have 
researched recruiter performance, covering topics such as the consequences of poor 
performance (Dertouzos, 1985), incentives and recruiter performance metrics 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006), command structure metrics (GAO, 
2007), and recruiter team or individual efforts (Dertouzos & Garber, 2007). While this 
study does not focus on recruiter efforts, it is important to understand the different aspects 
above that contribute to the selection process. Left to human nature regarding the amount 
of effort per quality contract, recruiting efforts would eventually migrate toward high 
population density areas of the country where it is easier to obtain high-quality applicants, 
thus neglecting portions of the country and reducing the number of selection boards 
required to meet manpower needs. The current recruiting structure provides adequate 
recruiter representation across the country’s population by ensuring every portion of the 
country is covered by one of six recruiting districts. Three districts are located in each of 
the two regions, providing MCRC the structure to ensure geographic diversity, which 
requires two regional boards and six district boards in order to meet the assigned officer 
accession mission. The research question related to this is: Does selection rate between 
geographically dislocated boards differ?  
Military applicant–focused research remains an area of interest as military services, 
recruiting personnel, policy-makers, and economists seek to better understand the impact 
of individual choice on military accessions. Quality depends as much on who the applicants 
are as it does the recruiters efforts. Several military-applicant focused studies cover areas 
such as labor economic factors (Warner, Simon & Payne, 2003), quality retention (Asch, 
Romley, & Totten, 2006), propensity (Bachman, Segal, Freedman, Doan, & O’Malley, 
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2000), service decision (Kane, 2005), and others (Mann, 2011) in an effort to determine 
how decisions to serve are made and who makes them. Additionally, policy decisions 
significantly impact one’s decision to serve. While we do not specifically examine these 
policies’ impact on quality, there is no doubt that policies such as college benefits strongly 
motivate military service applicants.  
The problem with examining officer board selection ratios is understanding the 
variables affecting the variation in the ratios and determining if variation exists. To address 
this issue, I utilize an OLS model in which I examine the officer selection ratios across 
years, districts, and component. I calculate the mean selection ratio by looking at all male 
and female applicants separately in each year regardless of commissioning source or board 
location and compare them to those selected in that year. I do the same for all districts and 
components, resulting in an overview of selection ratios for males and females across year, 
district, and components. We are able to see significant variation in the selection ratios for 
two reasons. First, the method highlights variations occurring in all three key areas, years, 
districts, and components. Further, of the three, we see year has the largest impact in the 
change in selection ratio. Second, even though selection ratios for males and females differ, 
the same trends exist. Once I determine variation in selection ratios, I utilize another OLS 
model in an attempt to observe the impact that selection ratio has on officer quality as 
measured by SAT and GPA score. The results suggest that selection rate negatively impacts 
officer quality. Lower selection rates correspond to a more competitive selection process 
and increased competition, resulting in increased quality observed by increased SAT and 
GPA scores. The final portion of this thesis examines the reasons why OCC and PLC 
boards view quality metrics differently. 
Two key limitations need to be addressed. First, the findings of this thesis highlight 
the importance of accurate and complete data for future analysis. Missing data in the SAT 
and GPA outcome variables make it difficult to capture the true affect selection ratio has 
on quality. Second, while quality is often measured using available metrics such as SAT 
and GPA, the Marine Corps values aspects of quality that are not captured in the data but 
are significant factors in the selection process.  
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The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides background 
information on the officer recruiting structure and processes of all four DoD military 
services as well as a review of the pertinent literature on recruiting, applicants, and 
recruiting policy. Chapter III describes the data and variables utilized for this research. 
Chapter IV details my empirical framework and methodology. Chapter V presents results 
and highlights the correlation between selection ratio and officer quality. Chapter VI 
concludes and provides recommendations to Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC). 
  
5 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Marine Corps recruiting began at the inception of the Corps in 1775. Over our 242-
year history, haphazard recruiting practices developed into a structured process with our 
mission and purpose focused on finding the best to serve within the ranks. The recruiting 
process experienced numerous challenges throughout the years, but none changed the 
recruiting structure more in recent history than the elimination of the draft in 1973. From 
1973 through the early 1990s, significant improvements in recruiting efforts occurred that 
ultimately led to the establishment of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command under a 
single commanding general with a single focused mission stated in MCRCO 1100.2A: 
The ultimate objective of Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) is 
the perpetuation of the Marine Corps and the standards of preparedness and 
military vigor that Marines have upheld since 1775. The immediate impact 
that recruiting has on the Marine Corps requires that standards for 
enlistment be strictly set to ensure that future Marines will maintain our 
tradition of excellence. Accordingly, the mission of the Marine Corps is to 
“Make Marines, Win Battles, and Return Quality Citizens” to their 
communities. (United States Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 2013, 
p. 1-1)
A. MARINE CORPS OFFICER RECRUITING 
1. Organizational Structure (Maps, Org Charts)
The organizational structure of recruiting commands between the services varies, 
and the recruiting Areas of Responsibility (AOR) are specific to each service. The 
graphical depiction of each service’s recruiting commands and AORs can be found for the 
Navy in Figure 1, Panel A, the Marine Corps in Figure 1, Panel B, the Air Force in Figure 
1, Panel C, and the Army in Figure 1, Panel D.  
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Figure 1.  Military Recruiting Organizational Structure Maps 
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Each service’s recruiting command has similar command structures. First, the Navy 
recruiting command has five levels: Commander Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), 
region, district, division, and Navy Recruiting Station (NRS). CNRC has two regions, East 
and West, and each region contains 13 districts. Each district has a varying number of 
divisions depending on the geographical area of responsibility (Commander of Navy 
Recruiting Command, 2017). Second, the Marine Corps has five levels: MCRC, region, 
district, RS, and Recruiting Sub-Station (RSS). MCRC has two regions, Eastern and 
Western, and each region contains three districts. Each district has a varying number of 
recruiting stations depending on the geographical area of responsibility (United States 
Recruiting Command, 2013). Third, the Air Force recruiting command contains four 
levels: Air Force Recruiting Command (AFRC), group, squadron, and flight. AFRC has 
three groups, and each group contains nine squadrons. Each squadron has a varying number 
of flights depending on the geographical area of responsibility (United States Air Force 
Recruiting Service, n.d.). Finally, the Army recruiting command contains four levels: 
United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), brigade, battalion, and company. 
USAREC has five brigades, and each brigade contains several battalions (5, 6, or 8 
depending on the brigade). Each brigade has a varying number of companies depending on 
the geographical area of responsibility (United States Army Recruiting Command, 2015). 




Figure 2.  Service Recruiting Command Organizational Chart. 
Source: GAO (2006).  
2. Officer Programs  
Examining where each service gains accessions and places their officer recruiting 
focus helps explain why the military services have different recruiting commands and AOR 
structures. Each of the services relies on the same types of programs for their source of 
commission when recruiting officers for accession into their respective service. However, 
each service focuses on the commissioning source programs differently. For example, 
Table 1 depicts active component commissioned officer gains: FY2015. As seen in Table 1, 
the Army strongly emphasizes service academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps  
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Table 1. Active Component Commissioned Officer Gains, FY15, by Source of 
Commission and Service. Adapted from Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness (2015). 
 
 
(ROTC) (Scholarship and Non-Scholarship) accession programs accounting for 74 percent 
of their officer recruiting efforts (Table 1) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Personnel and Readiness, 2015). The Navy has the most well-rounded officer recruiting 
effort with officer accession distributions of 20.2 percent service academy, 19.5 percent 
Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), 25.3 percent PLC/OCS and 18.8 percent 
Direct Appointment (Table 1) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and 
Readiness, 2015). The Marine Corps has the narrowest focus with 17 percent coming from 
the Navy’s service academy and 74.6 percent from PLC/OCC programs and other sources 
(Table 1) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 2015). Of 
the four services, the Air Force relies heaviest on ROTC (47.4 percent) and 19.3 percent 
from their service academy (Table 1) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel 
and Readiness, 2015). Additionally, the recruiting infrastructures of each of the services 
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are better understood because it is clear the four services rely on different accession sources 
to varying degrees. For example, the Army ROTC program contains a significant 
manpower footprint, enjoys the benefit of feeder programs such as Junior Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (JROTC), and has a well-established recruiting network, but the ROTC 
program does not fall under the Army Recruiting Command structure (GAO, 2007). The 
United States Military Academy, like all service academies, is a very competitive 
institution and can be selective with applicants. Due to this recruiting structure, 75.1 
percent of Army officers come from accession programs outside the Army Recruiting 
Command (Table 1) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 
2015). In contrast, the Marine Corps obtains 74.9 percent of officer accessions from 
PLC/Officer Candidate School (OCS) and Other (OCC) programs that fall under MCRC 
and require significant resources to support, thus increasing the risk of failing to meet 
assigned mission goals (Table 1) (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and 
Readiness, 2015).  
3. Officer Recruiting Process  
a. Officer Procurement Process 
All four services have similar officer procurement processes for recruiting qualified 
individuals into their respective services (Policy and Programs Division, Operations 
Department, Navy Recruiting Command, 2017; Air Force Recruiting Service, 2012; 
United States Army Recruiting Command, 2005; United States Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command, 2015). Figure 3 depicts the Marine Corps officer procurement process from the 
officer recruiting plan to commissioning (United States Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command, 2015). The officer procurement process differs from the enlisted recruiting 
process in that contracts only count toward recruitment goals when the appropriate level 
board selects them (General Accounting Office, 1998). This incentivizes recruiters to 
recruit high-quality applicants.  
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Figure 3.  Officer Procurement Process. Source: United States Marine Corps 
Recruiting Command (2015). 
b. Contract-to-Commissioning
The officer procurement process begins with mission planning and concludes with 
commissioning and order to The Basic School (TBS). Figure 4 depicts a broad view of the 
contact to commissioning process for Marine Corps PLC and OCC commissioning 
programs. While there are numerous other commissioning programs such as the service 
academy, the Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP), the Marine Corps Enlisted 
Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), and the ROTC (United States Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command, 2015), accession quantities from these programs are a small 
portion of total Marine Corps accessions (United States Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command, 2013). Additionally, accessions from the service academies, ECP, MECEP, and 
ROTC sources go through a rigorous screening process prior to being commissioned.  
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Figure 4.  Contact-to-Commissioning Chain for Officer Programs. Source: 
United States Marine Corps Recruiting Command (2015). 
4. Officer Selection Process
Commissioning source selection processes differ by commissioning program and 
service. ROTC programs serve as a pre-screening recruiting and selection program. The 
ROTC commander makes the selection decision, and academy admissions boards make 
the service academy selection decisions. The PLC accession program supports individuals 
who are in college and desire to serve as a commissioned officer in the service upon 
completion of school. The OCC accession program supports individuals who have 
completed college and desire to serve as a commissioned officer in the service. 
Applications to serve via these programs entail a board selection process that occurs at 
different levels for each of the services (United States Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 
2015). For example, the Navy PLC/OCC selection board occurs at CNRC while the Army 
conducts their selection boards at the battalion level. In contrast, the Marine Corps conducts 
PLC selection boards at the district level and OCC selection boards at the region level three 
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times a year to coincide with the three OCS training periods (January, Summer, and 
October).  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A rigorous review of the literature was unable to find any studies on selection ratios 
to this point. Thus, there are few studies relating to this topic. However, there are three 
main areas of study that significantly impact this research: recruiter focused studies, 
applicant focused studies, and policy focused studies.  
1. Recruiter Focus 
Recruiter performance remains a key factor in meeting service officer recruiting 
goals. Dertouzos (1985) analyzes how supply and demand factors influence recruiter 
behavior in recruiting for the enlisted ranks. Dertouzos finds that recruiters can substitute 
low-quality enlistments for high-quality enlistments at a rate of four to one, and recruiter 
assigned quotas can impact estimates regarding the effects of the economy and how 
resources are utilized. Additionally, Dertouzos determines high performing recruiters, that 
is, those who meet their high-quality assigned quotas, are less likely to change their 
behavior by increasing production due to incentives than those recruiters who do not meet 
their high-quality quotas. Dertouzos concludes these findings indicate behavioral 
differences that a recruiter’s productivity can have on the quality of enlistments and 
demonstrate that recruiter performance can play a significant role in the quality of 
accessions (Dertouzos, 1985).  
Consequently, poor recruiter performance can negatively impact accession quality. 
A 2006 United States Government Accountability Office report “defines recruiter 
irregularities as those willful and un-willful acts of omission and improprieties that are 
perpetrated by a recruiter or alleged to be perpetrated by a recruiter to facilitate the 
recruiting process for an applicant” (GAO, 2006, p. 3). As such, GAO (2006) highlights 
recruiter wrongdoing as a potential problem in missing recruiting missions and reducing 
quality accessions. The report explains that typically the services utilize the number of 
contracts recruiters sign as a metric for incentive programs such as awards or increased 
performance evaluations. However, GAO (2006) states “the Marine Corps uses basic 
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training attrition rates as a key component of the recruiter’s performance evaluation” 
(GAO, 2006, p. 5). The report further asserts that this criterion serves to incentivize 
recruiters to sign contracts for those who have the qualities required to complete basic 
training. GAO (2006) states that this policy focuses on enlisted recruiting and is similar to 
using applicant selection as a criterion for counting officer applicants in officer recruiting. 
More effective recruiting practices lead to more efficient processes and recruits 
successfully completing basic training, saving taxpayer dollars and reducing attrition at 
basic training (GAO, 2006). Additionally, properly incentivized recruiters ensure they are 
focused on quality and not just quantity (General Accounting Office, 1998). 
Another area of study examines the impact changes in population has on the 
recruiter’s mission. Population metrics that support fair and equitable recruiting practices 
remain a useful tool when developing recruiting plans for the military. Jareb and Parker 
(2001) study the military officer recruiting market composition and density using the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), the Barron’s Profile of 
American Colleges 2001, the College Board College Handbook 2001, and DoD officer 
accession data to create a Qualified Candidate Population (QCP) based analysis of the 
officer’s recruiting market. QCP provides MCRC with a measure of the estimated recruiter 
market share, is the basis for officer mission goal assignments, and aligns with MCRC’s 
policy to recruit a diverse, high-quality officer corps (Jareb & Parker, 2001). This study 
focuses on where officer accessions come from and how to fairly assign missions based on 
the size of the candidate pool, and they recommend restructuring the recruiting districts for 
a more equitable QCP distribution to help realign the officer recruiting Officer Selection 
Officer (OSO) assignments (Jareb & Parker, 2001).  
Kelley (2005) updates the QCP to Jareb and Parker (2001) by keeping the analytical 
approach in determining the QCP the same as the previous report but considers changes in 
population, college attendance, and demographics. The study reports changes in quantity 
and diversity, especially in the Hispanic population and was used to aid MCRC in assigning 
OSOs within the districts and/or to provide OSOs with direction in allocating recruiting 
resources (Kelly, 2005).  
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Wenger and Kelley (2006) build on previous research by updating QCP 
calculations and evaluating QCP estimate predictions by comparing school QCP with 
schools officers attended. They conclude that 40 percent of Marine officers attend only five 
percent of the schools in the sample, which tend to be large, selective public schools 
(Wenger & Kelley, 2006). Additionally, Wenger and Kelly (2006) report that increased 
productivity at select schools remains in line with varying propensity estimates across 
districts and recommend OSOs continue to focus on recruiting at these productive 
institutions (Wenger & Kelley, 2006). 
Malone and Kelley (2015) standardize the QCP derivative process for the Marine 
Corps by specifically focusing on female QCP in response to the potential increase in 
female Marine’s role in combat arms MOSs. Malone and Kelly (2015) calculate QCP for 
two specific areas, school level QCP and County level QCP, in order to determine if OSO 
resource reallocation would be necessary to meet a change in female applicant officer 
recruiting. Malone and Kelly (2015) first categorized total QCP figures by district then by 
gender and race, and they found that female and male applicants are geographically located 
in the same places, meaning no OSO resource reallocation was necessary (Malone & 
Kelley, 2015). 
Some studies analyze recruiting program structure and determine decentralized 
recruiting programs may lead to missing accession goals. A 2007 United States 
Government Accountability Office report analyzes the potential problems within the 
Army’s officer accession and retention challenges and finds that the decentralized structure 
of the Army’s officer accession programs and lack of their formal coordination with one 
another makes it difficult for the Army to compensate for shortfalls across accession 
programs. While the Army is the focus of this report, it comparatively analyzes all services. 
During the early 2000s, according to the report, all services fell short accessing officers in 
one or more of the following areas: medical officer occupations, Naval Flight Officers, and 
some racial and ethnic groups such as African Americans and Hispanics. This report 
summarizes that the key issue of missing accession and retention goals are traced back to 
the lack of overall service recruiting structure under a single mission and command (GAO, 
2007). 
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While the GAO (2007) analyzes the recruiting command structure, other studies 
focus on the recruiting structure of teams versus individual efforts to analyze the effect on 
the types of officers recruited and screened on officer selection boards. Dertouzos and 
Garber (2006) aim to provide new insights into recruiter-management policies in the Army 
by using three datasets. First, they use a 1998–2000 dataset analyzing recruiter 
performance in enlisting higher and lower quality recruits in an individual basis. Second, 
they use a dataset for a 30-month period from January 2001 through June 2003 where 
recruiting missions were assigned and accessed as a team. The third dataset covers a 10-
year period from 1987 to 1996 to analyze several outcomes to include who became 
recruiters, productivity rates, the length of recruiting tours, and the promotion rates of 
recruiters versus non-recruiters. In their research, they find that teams of recruiters were 
more effective than individuals, recruiters with dependents’ and those from technical, 
combat, and intelligence Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) tended to be more 
productive while AFQT score and level of education seemed to have no effect on 
performance (Dertouzos & Garber 2006).  
Recruiters remain an important factor in successful officer recruiting. Incentives 
motivate recruiters to perform at a higher level, which can impact the quality of applicants 
being sent to selection boards and ultimately affect the quality of the officer corps. While 
this study does not focus on recruiter performance, it is important to note the critical role 
recruiters play in the officer selection process.  
2. Applicant Focus 
Factors external to the military recruiting structure impact the quantity and quality 
of officer applicants, which requires careful and deliberate consideration when developing 
recruiting plans. In an effort to explain the recruiting slowdown, Warner et al. (2003) 
analyze recruiting from 1989–1997 and note the estimated impacts of economic variables 
such as military pay and unemployment when compared to the civilian sector. Warner, 
Simon, and Payne (2003) find that variables associated with recruiting resources, 
recruiters, and advertising are important factors when trying to explain the recruiting 
slowdown during this time period. However, their research identifies two trends: the 
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increase in college enrollment and fewer adult veterans as important factors in explaining 
fewer enlistments over time (Warner, Simon, & Payne, 2003). Warner, Simon, and Payne’s 
research points out the services experienced an increasingly difficult recruiting time 
following the end of the data period and responded by making changes, specifically 
increasing recruiters, advertising, and enlistment incentives. While these actions address 
the shortfall issues, they increase the cost of obtaining high-quality recruits and may not be 
cost efficient in the future (Warner, Simon, & Payne, 2003).  
Another area of research includes the quality of individuals who enter and remain 
in service. Asch, Romley, and Totten (2005) analyze the quality of personnel in the enlisted 
ranks of the armed forces by comparing two methods of quality measurement. The first 
method they use measures quality from entry through the first enlistment (4 Years of 
Service (YOS)), and mid- career (8 YOS and 12 YOS) using the AFQT scores of service 
members as they enter the service. Their findings using this method are as follows: (1) the 
average quality of those who attrite is not much different than those who complete their 
first term, (2) the quality of those who reenlist is slightly lower than those who complete 
their first term, and (3) those who remain in service through mid-career are not much 
different in terms of quality than those who leave (Asch et al., 2006). Asch, Romley, and 
Totten argue that generally, the difference in quality, as measured by AFQT, is not much 
different between those who remain in service and those who leave. They conclude that the 
average quality person recruited is the quality retained by the service. The second method 
their research employs uses a quality index that measures other factors of quality such as 
job match and returned significantly different. Asch et al. state “using the quality index as 
our measure, we find that those who complete their first term, those who stay until the 
eighth or twelfth YOS (that is, to their mid-career), and those who are promoted to higher 
grades are of significantly higher quality” (Asch et al., 2006, p. xiv). The authors contend 
this is due to the quality index that includes information revealed on the job. These findings 
illuminate the importance of high-quality accessions and measuring retained quality 
personnel using more relevant metrics (Asch et al., 2006).  
Another area of research has been conducted on who chooses military service and 
who carries the burden of service. Bachman, Segal, Freedman-Doan, and O’Malley (2000) 
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examine the factors that lead someone to choose the military as a viable career option and 
the factors that lead to successful entry into the service (Bachman et al., 2000). Bachman 
et al. maintain that since joining the service is a bilateral decision, i.e. the individual applies 
and the service accepts him/her, the study examines the choice to serve and successful entry 
into the service. They focus on a few key areas in determining military propensity: (1) 
family background and demographics, (2) educational attainment and plans, and (3) 
attitudes, values, and behaviors (Bachman et al., 2000). Bachman et al. analyze numerous 
aspects of propensity to include gender, number of parents in the home, the level of parent 
education, and plan for college and grades at completion of high school, to name a few, 
and find as parent education level increases, the less likely their children will have the 
desire to enlist. This trend is troubling because, as noted in Warner, Simon, and Payne 
(2003), the rising trend in college attendance is a key contributor in the decline in 
enlistments. If an increase in parent education level is associated with a decrease in their 
child’s propensity to serve and college participation rates continue to increase, the next 
several generations of recruiters will find it increasingly more difficult to meet recruiting 
goals (Warner, Simon, & Payne 2003).  
While Bachman, Segal, Freedman-Doan, and O’Malley (2000) examine the 
propensity of those who apply and are accepted in the military, Kane (2005) examines the 
demographic composition of two cohorts within the military before and after 9/11, 1999 
and 2003. He examines four characteristics: (1) race/ethnicity, (2) region/rural origin, (3) 
education level, and (4) household income and concludes the demographics of those 
serving is representative of the population of the United States (Kane, 2005). Similarly, 
McHugh and Hattiangadi (2006) address the perception that the military option is 
particularly appealing to disadvantaged youth who might have fewer civilian job 
opportunities and find no statistical evidence supporting this claim. Together these two 
studies provide insight into the demographics of those who serve.  
Free labor market factors and individual decision remains a significant area of 
research related to an applicant’s decision to serve. Mann (2011) examines military service 
as a key aspect of the free labor market. Specifically, Mann’s research analyzes the factors 
surrounding an individual’s decision to serve in the military with other opportunities by 
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placing individuals into five categories: (1) serving in active duty military, (2) staying 
home, (3) serving in reserve military (4) work in the civilian sector, or (5) attending school,. 
Additionally, Mann further states that if an individual works in the civilian sector or stays 
home, then he can also serve in the reserve military. Mann (2011) examines an individual’s 
choices in the free labor market and concludes that individuals will attempt to maximize 
their utility in each time period they must make a decision (Mann, 2011). 
Given these studies’ findings, factors impacting the applicant’s decision to serve 
also remain important in successful officer recruiting. Economic variables such as the 
rising cost of college, military pay and incentives compared to civilian alternatives, and the 
decline of the veteran population coupled with the demographic characteristics of who 
chooses to serve will define the applicant population military recruiters recruit from. These 
factors along with the free labor market will shape the applicant pool and can impact the 
quality of applicants being sent to selection boards and ultimately affect the quality of the 
officer corps. While this study does not focus on the numerous factors associated with an 
applicant’s decision to serve, it is important to note the critical role economic factors play 
in the officer selection process.  
3. Policy Focus 
Policy plays a significant role in developing recruiting plans and government 
policies, affecting incentives and entitlements that significantly impacts an individual’s 
decision to join the service. Several policy options are available to lawmakers when 
considering the service’s ability to meet recruiting goals and support the nation’s military 
manpower requirements. Warner and Asch (2001) observe that after the draft ended in 
1973, the topic of reinstatement emerge during periods of economic success when 
unemployment rates are low and military recruiting efforts fall on hard times. Warner and 
Asch examine the history of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) since 1973 and catalogs the 
various ups and downs from 1973 until 2001. Based on this history, they conclude the AVF 
is sustainable, stating “Military recruiting and retention are sufficiently responsive to 
compensation and other incentives that there exist feasible levels of pecuniary and 
nonmonetary incentives that will allow the armed forces to meet their strength objectives—
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in terms of numbers, quality, and experience-now and in the foreseeable future” (Warner 
& Asch, 2001. p. 187).  
Other policies designed to increase quantity and quality of enlistments are 
education funding programs. Asch, Du, and Schonlau (2004) conducted a national survey 
of 17 to 21-year-old high school seniors headed to college, students currently attending 
college, and students who have dropped out of college to determine the effectiveness of 
education benefits on enlistment decisions. The Montgomery GI Bill, Post 9/11 GI Bill, 
College First, and Loan Repayment Program (LRP) are among a few such policies utilized 
to provide benefits in lieu of increased pay entitlements and enlistment bonuses (Asch, Du, 
& Schonlau, 2004). The authors assert these programs strengthen recruiting efforts by 
increasing the quantity and quality of applicants. The authors show that since many service 
members and applicants generally do not maximize the program benefits, these policies 
become more cost effective than pay and allowance increases because although the amount 
of the benefit is high, historically only a quarter of the benefit is claimed (Asch, Du, & 
Schonlau, 2004). 
As a whole, policy remains an important factor in successful officer recruiting. 
Incentives such as financial entitlements for college or loan repayment programs can 
motivate applicants to consider military service. These policies can impact the quality of 
applicants being sent to selection boards and ultimately affect the quality of the officer 
corps. While this study does not focus on policy implications on the quality of Marine 
officers, it is important to note the critical role policy plays in the officer selection process.  
Finally, previous studies utilizing multivariate analysis on recruiting and accessions 
indicate the importance of examining variables associated with recruiter ability, applicant 
choices, and policy decisions in regression models to estimate the impact these areas have 
on the decision to serve in the military. Prior research demonstrates the necessity to 
examine the numerous variables associated with the decision to serve. Quality remains a 
key factor in the Marine officer selection process. Therefore, this study includes selection 
ratio variables from Marine officer selection boards into the multivariate regression 
estimates to contribute new independent variables to the body of research concerning 
officer selection process.  
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III. DATA AND VARIABLES 
I use a MCRC provided dataset from the Marine Corps Recruiting Information 
Support System (MCRISS) database, which captures all applicants who applied to become 
Marine Corps Officers between 2007 and 2017. This dataset is at the individual level and 
contains various demographic information, commissioning program data, component, and 
academic and physical performance measures for 39,204 observations. The component 
variable can be further broken down into four subcategories: air, ground, law, and Naval 
Flight Officer (NFO). I drop individuals from the dataset for three reasons. First, MCRISS 
contains data on all officer commissioning programs, and this study only focuses on the 
PLC and OCC programs.1 Second, observations from 2007 and 2008 contained significant 
gaps in the data, making these years unreliable. Third, only applicants considered on a 
selection board for the OCC or PLC officer commissioning programs were retained 
excluding applicants who were not considered on a selection board. The final sample 
contains 14,911 observations.  
One significant limitation of this dataset is that selection decisions are made based 
on numerous factors, some of which are present in the data while others or not. As a result, 
I use SAT/American College Test (ACT) scores and GPA as a proxy for desirable quality. 
The Marine Corps places significant weight on leadership roles and abilities as quality 
metrics when making selection decisions. However, such desirable traits are not quantified 
in the data. Since SAT/ACT scores and GPA can represent levels of intelligence, hard 
work, and determination and establish a metric for measuring competition on the boards, I 
use these scores to measure the applicant’s quality. The use of SAT/ACT and GPA as 
quality metrics is similar to Dertouzos, (1985) use of AFQT to measure enlisted accession 
quality.  
                                                 
1 PLC and OCC are two of the 12 commissioning programs in the Marine Corps.  The other programs 
are Officer Candidate School Reserve (OCCR), Unites States Naval Academy (USNA), United States 
Military Academy (USMA), United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Enlisted Commissioning Program 
(ECP), Reserve Enlisted Commissioning Program, (RECP), Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning 
Education Program (MECEP), Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Meritorious 
Commissioning Program (MCP), and Meritorious Commissioning Program Reserve (MCP-R) (United States 
Marine Corps Recruiting Command, 2015). 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics for all PLC and OCC applicants that were 
considered on a Marine Corps officer selection board during this time period. 86.6 percent 
of the sample are male, 70.8 percent white, 7.7 percent black, and so on. During this time 
period, 42.2 percent were OCC applicants and 57.8 percent were PLC applicants. As 
expected due to the manpower needs of the Marine Corps, ground contracts and air 
contracts make up the largest portion of applicants.  
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Raw data obtained from Marine Corps Recruiting Information Reporting System. 
 
Marine Corps recruiting districts are assigned their mission by two categories: 
components and commissioning programs. For example, First Marine Corps District 2016 
OCC assigned mission was 28 air contracts, 143 ground contracts, 9 law contracts, and 2 
NFO contracts. PLC and OCC applicants are considered on separate selection boards and 
are thus analyzed separately according to their commissioning program. Additionally, 
OCC and PLC commissioning programs consider applicants from different population 
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groups. For example, OCC applicants are college graduates while PLC applicants are 
typically considered on a selection board in their second or third year of college.  
Next, selection ratio depicts the ratio between the number of selectees to the number 
of applicants on a selection board. The number of applicants represents only those that 
made it to a selection board and excludes applicants that were prescreened as unqualified, 
applicant withdrawal, or they were removed from consideration by the RS, District or 
Region for any number of reasons. District assigned mission for each component dictates 
the officer accession requirement. Once an applicant has been selected they count toward 
the district mission. Selected applicants include all applicants that were board selected 
regardless if they later withdrew their application, refused commission, or were dis-
enrolled from the program at any point after selection for any reason.  
I examine selection ratio across all selection boards, components, commissioning 
sources, and both genders and observe significant variation. Figure 5 shows the selection 
ratio across 281 male selection boards in the dataset. For comparison, this figure shows the 
frequency of selection ratios across all boards varies between 0.4 and 1.0, meaning the 
competitive nature of the selection boards changes throughout this time period. Females 
represent 13.4 percent of all officer applicants from 2009 thru 2017 and 9.2 percent of all 
commissioned officers in the Marine Corps in 2015 (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 2015). Selection boards consider male and female 
applicants separately by commissioning program and component, resulting in different 
selection ratios between males and females. Figure 6 shows the selection ratio across 189 
female selection boards in the dataset.  
As some applicants took the SAT and others took the ACT, I create a new variable 
that equals the percentile score on the test that was taken; a few applicants took both tests, 
and for these individuals I use the mean percentile score. 
Several variables required condensing to be useful for analysis. First, education 
dummy variable Master’s degree includes observations containing master’s, First 




Raw data obtained from Marine Corps Recruiting Information Reporting System. 
Figure 5.  Selection Ratio for Males across all Board Levels, Component, and 
Commissioning Sources  
 
Raw data obtained from Marine Corps Recruiting Information Reporting System. 
Figure 6.  Selection Ratio for Females across all Board Levels, Components, and 
Commissioning Sources 
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single. Divorced, widowed, and annulled are considered single, and separated is considered 
married.  
This research is predicated on the fact that recruiting missions are assigned to six 
different districts throughout the country by component, gender, and commissioning source 
and boarded at eight different locations, and each board selects applicants at different rates 
as a source of variation. Other than applicants moving into a specific district, applicants 
have no say in which district they can apply to become an officer. Additionally, based on 
MCRC recruiting policy, MCRC assigns recruiting missions based on the district QCP, 
ensuring a fair and equitable balance of Marine officer accessions across the districts and 
ensuring demographic and geographic diversity. Since geographic diversity is a premium, 
the potential for quality variation among the districts exists.  
In short, the dataset from MCRISS appears to be sufficient in size and contains the 
necessary variables required in order to conduct this analysis. The composition of the 
dataset demonstrates sufficient variability with respect to gender, race, education level, 
commissioning programs, type of contracts and the remaining variables. The selection 
ratios developed from this dataset form the basis of this analysis making it possible to 
compare ratios between districts, regions, genders, commissioning programs, and 
components. Additionally, creating the variable test score from SAT and ACT scores plus 
using GPA to measure quality and utilize them as the outcome variables create the 
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IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
The first step in my analysis is to calculate the selection ratios for each board. There 
is one board for each commissioning source, component, district, and gender in each year 
for a total of 470 boards. Table 3 shows the variation of selection ratios across the 
population. For example, the mean selection ratios for males across 31 selection boards in 
2009 is 96.5 percent and 88.1 percent in 2010, while the mean selection ratio for females 
across 18 selection boards in 2009 is 96.4 percent. First Marine Corps District conducted 
54 male selection boards with a mean selection ratio of 74.3 percent and 32 female selection 
boards with a mean selection ratio of 62.4 percent. Variation in the selection ratio suggests 
that competition between boards change from year to year, district to district, and between 
components.  
Table 3. Mean Selection Ratio for Males and Females across all Years, 




Model (1) estimates the effects of the selection ratio on different selection boards 
using OLS and includes fixed effects for selection board locations, commissioning 
programs, components, and gender. This model aims to explain the difference in selection 
ratio between the fixed effects and addresses the question of where variation in selection 
ratio occurs with respect to these variables. Model (1) explains that the selection ratio y of 
a single board i for component w and gender m at time t will vary across these variables. 
Model (1) describes the variation in selection ratio between years, districts, and 
components. 
𝛾𝛾𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄 = 𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)  +  𝛽𝛽2(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) +  𝛽𝛽3(𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) +  𝛽𝛽4(𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷) +
 𝛽𝛽5(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) +  𝛽𝛽6(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) +  𝜀𝜀  (1) 
 
Relying on assigned mission and geographic diversity for officer accessions, model 
(2) uses OLS to estimate the effects of the selection ratio on the two quality metrics I 
observe in the data: SAT and GPA score for all applicants selected to become officers. 
Grouping all variables together and examining selection ratios across all years, all 
components, both genders, and all geographic locations would not isolate the partial 
correlation between the selection ratio and the outcome because, as Table 3 shows, the 
selection ratios vary systematically across the observable characteristics of the boards. For 
example, air contracts are only compared to other air contracts, and ground contracts are 
only compared to other ground contracts, and male and female applicants are not compared 
to one another for each component. Each year multiple selection boards are held at each of 
the six districts and both regions. Thus, model (2) includes fixed effects for year, 
geographic location, component, and gender while controlling for race, age, marital status, 
education, year, physical fitness test (PFT), and the number of waivers. Model (2) aims to 
explain the impact selection ratio has on quality and addresses the question of does 
increased competition as measured in lower selection ratios increase officer quality. 𝛽𝛽1is 
the primary coefficient of interest and reflects the partial correlation between selection ratio 
and the quality of selected officers.  
𝛾𝛾𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄𝜄 = 𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)  +  𝛽𝛽2(𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷) +  𝛽𝛽3 (𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) +




V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. DESCRIBING THE VARIATION IN SELECTION RATIOS 
Table 4 displays the results of model (1), the selection ratio of OCC and PLC boards 
by male and female, show selection ratios vary across year, component, and gender plays 
a role in how selection ratio varies. Column 1 of Table 4 displays the results of Model (1) 
for 71 male OCC board observations, Column 2 displays the results for 210 male PLC 
board observations, Column 3 displays the results for 57 female OCC board observations, 
and Column 4 displays the results for 132 female PLC board observations.  
Model (1) shows a statistically significant male OCC board selection ratio of 
-0.0664 (p<0.05), signifying Eastern Recruiting Region (ERR) male OCC boards is 6.64 
percentage points fewer than those on Western Recruiting Region (WRR) boards. Given 
that the overall average selection ratio for males on OCC boards is 71.7 percent across the 
population, this signifies a 9.3 percent increase in the selection ratio between the two 
regions suggesting ERR is more competitive than WRR by 9.3 percent. The female OCC 
selection boards are not statistically significant suggesting selection ratios of females on 
OCC boards are the same between the two regions.  
The results of Model (1) for males on PLC boards are mixed, showing a statistically 
significant estimate of -0.0689 (p<0.05) for 9th MCD and -0.0611 (p<0.05) for 12th MCD 
when compared to 4th MCD. This signifies the selection ratio on 9th MCD and 12th MCD 
male PLC boards is 6.89 and 6.11 percentage points respectively less than those on 4th 
MCD boards. Given that the overall average selection ratio for males on PLC boards is 
78.7 percent across the population, this signifies an 8.75 percent and 7.76 percent decrease 
in the selection ratio for 9th MCD and 12th MCD respectively when compared to 4th MCD, 
suggesting 9th MCD and 12th MCD are more competitive. The coefficients of 1st MCD, 6th 
MCD, and 8th MCD are closer to zero and not statistically significant, suggesting that 
selection ratios of males on PLC boards are the same between the 1st MCD, 4th MCD, 6th 
MCD, and 8th MCD selection boards. The female PLC selection boards are not statistically 
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significant, suggesting that selection ratios of females on PLC boards are the same between 
districts. 
Table 4. The Selection Ratio of OCC and PLC Boards by Male and Female 
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Additionally, the year variables show that there is a large variation in selection ratio 
over time for boards in both commissioning programs for males and females. With few 
exceptions, year coefficients are statistically significant with very low standard errors, 
signifying that the difference from year to year on board selection ratios impacts the 
variation of selection ratios. Coefficients for both male and female OCC selection boards 
decrease (more competitive) from 2010 through 2014 then increase (less competitive) 
through 2016. OCC board selection ratios are more responsive to the variation from year 
to year than PLC selection board trends, but both commissioning programs for both 
genders follow the same trend. This makes sense because the Marine Corps experienced a 
reduction in end strength during this time period, which reduces accession missions and 
increases competition. Since the OCC application to selection timeline can be as little as 
two to three months and commissioning slightly longer, OCC becomes the first 
commissioning program to experience rapid changes in mission to meet the Marine Corps’ 
manpower needs. PLC year coefficients move in the same direction but lag behind OCC 
and are not as significant in magnitude. One possible explanation is that the PLC 
application to selection timeline can be just as short as OCC applicants. However, 
commissioning takes two to three years when the applicant graduates college, meaning it 
takes longer to realize the effect of mission adjustments to the PLC commission program.  
Finally, the component variables (Air, Law, NFO) illustrate how contract type 
affects selection ratio across both commissioning programs for male and female selection 
boards. Air contract coefficients for both male and female are positive, illustrating that air 
contracts are less competitive than ground contracts. Additionally, OCC air contract 
coefficients for both male and female are smaller and less statistically significant than PLC 
air contract coefficients (p<0.1 compared to p<0.01), illustrating that OCC air contract 
selection rates are more competitive than PLC air contracts because they have a smaller 
impact on the selection ratio. Female air contract coefficients are marginally higher than 
their male counterparts, suggesting that the selection of female air contracts is slightly less 
competitive than their male counterparts. NFO and Law contract coefficients are not 
statistically significant when compared to ground contracts due in part to significantly 
fewer contracts available per year. 
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B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTION RATIOS AND QUALITY 
Table 5 displays the results of Model (2), the effects of selection ratio on test score 
and GPA score for selected Marine officers, show quality increases and selection ratio 
decreases. Column 1of Table 5 displays average PLC (z) Test Score containing 4,322 
observations of SAT z scores for only PLC applicants. Column 2 of Table 5 displays 
average PLC (z) GPA Score containing 2,746 observations of GPA scores for only PLC 
applicants. Column 3 of Table 5 displays average OCC (z) Test Score containing 2,962 
observations of SAT z scores for only OCC applicants. Column 4 of Table 5 displays 
average OCC (z) GPA Score containing 2,883 observations of GPA scores for only OCC 
applicant’s. 
I estimate Model (2) for four different populations, as shown in Table 5. As 
discussed earlier, commissioning program applicants are only compared to other same 
program applicants. Additionally, the total observations used in model (2) is 12,913, which 
is less than the 14,911 contained in 470 boards and used to calculate the ratios in Model 
(1) due to some observations missing SAT and GPA scores. The coefficient of interest for 
all four populations analyzed in Model (2) is selection ratio impact on the outcome 
variables Average PLC (z) Test Score, Average PLC (z) GPA Score, Average OCC (z) 
Test Score, and Average OCC (z) GPA Score. All other variables are relevant and they are 
included as control variables because they are necessary to differentiate the impact on the 
outcome variables. 
 The results of Model (2) suggest that the variation in selection ratio impact the 
quality of some applicants selected to become Marine officers. Table 5 shows selection 
ratio changes negatively affect test score and GPA outcome variables, that is, as selection 
ratio decreases, the quality of selected applicants increases. Both PLC z-score test score 
and OCC z-GPA score show a statistically significant estimate of -0.319 (p<0.1) and -0.530 
(p<0.01) respectively, signifying that PLC and OCC programs rely on different metrics to 
measure quality. PLC z-GPA score and OCC z-Test Score coefficients are not statistically 
significant supporting the idea that these two programs view quality metrics differently. 
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Table 5. The Effect of Selection Ratio on Test Score and GPA Score for 





Statistically insignificant selection ratio coefficients for average PLC z-score of 
GPA scores imply GPA score is not as significant a measure of quality for PLC applicants. 
One possible explanation is that SAT scores are the most current and recent stationary 
performance metric relied upon to make selection decisions. PLC applicants are still 
attending school and have the ability to impact their GPA, and since their GPA 
continuously updates throughout an applicant’s time in the PLC program, it is a less reliable 
quality metric. Likewise, the statistically insignificant selection ratio coefficient for 
average OCC z-score of test scores implies that test score is not as significant a measure of 
performance for OCC applicants. One possible explanation is that GPA is the most current 
stationary performance metric, relied upon to make selection decisions and SAT scores are 
an older metric making it less relevant to OCC applicants. Once an applicant graduates 
from college, their GPA becomes the most current stationary performance metric. 
C. SUMMARY 
This study confirms the intuitive answer to the question ‘Does increased 
competition lead to increase quality?’ based on the quality metrics available. On average, 
we find that PLC applicant’s test scores increase with a statistically significant decrease in 
PLC board selection ratio at the district level. PLC selection boards do not use GPA as a 
quality metric because the applicant has the ability to change their GPA through changing 
performance. OCC applicants’ GPA scores increase with a statistically significant decrease 
in OCC board selection ratio at the region level. OCC boards do not use SAT as a quality 
metric because GPA is a more relevant metric of performance. 
An analysis of the statistically significant selection ratio coefficients reveals OCC 
selection boards are more competitive than PLC boards. This could be due to fewer OCC 
program slots available, resulting in lower mission numbers when compared to PLC. The 
OCC commissioning program has the shortest contact to commissioning timeline, making 
it the first program to react to policy changes in the short term while plans to adjust other 
commissioning programs take time. Overall, this research finds that variation in selection 




I estimate the effect selection ratio of officer selection boards on the quality of 
applicants that a board chooses in an attempt to determine if the selection ratio across 
various commissioning programs, board levels, components, and genders is independent 
of the quality of applicants. Given a null hypothesis that selection ratio is independent of 
applicant quality, the results of this study conclude rejecting the null. This study shows that 
the selection ratio of a board is correlated with the quality of selected officers. Specifically, 
SAT and GPA scores will increase with more competitive boards as seen with lower 
selection ratios. Each program relies on different quality or performance metrics when 
making their selection decision. As the selection ratio of PLC boards decreases, quality of 
selected applicants with regard to SAT score increases. Additionally, As the selection ratio 
of OCC boards decreases, quality of selected applicants with regard to GPA score 
increases.  
Recruiting the best applicants possible for officer selection remains a top priority 
for the Marine Corps. However, the data collected make it difficult to determine if the 
Marine Corps is in fact selecting the best applicants. SAT and GPA scores can be utilized 
as proxies for quality, yet several other qualities such as leadership ability, experience, and 
aptitude are not captured in the data but remain important factors when selecting applicants 
to become Marine officers. While the results cannot suggest the Marine Corps’ policy of 
setting specific SAT or GPA score metrics might be leading to not selecting some 
potentially otherwise qualified applicants, the lack of specific data to examine the issue 
more in depth and accurately remains a concern.  
There are a few lessons to be learned from conducting this analysis. First, similar 
to other studies I find it difficult to quantify and estimate one’s leadership qualities and 
forecast who will become an outstanding performer based on current collected data. I 
recommend the Marine Corps increase their data collection processes to include leadership 
ability, experience and aptitude metrics of applicants and maintain records in MCRISS for 
further study. This means developing a quantifiable metric to capture the intangibles 
considered on a selection board and recording this data as part of the selection process. Just 
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as test scores serve as a proxy for intelligence and intellectual ability, an individual’s 
extracurricular activities and life experiences can serve as a proxy for leadership abilities. 
For example, if current Marine Corps Officers identified as higher performing leaders via 
their fitness reports share common experiences between the ages of 14 and 22 such as 
participation in sports, Boy Scouts, volunteering, religious activities, world travel, or 
tutoring, these variables could signal the leadership qualities the Marine Corps desires in 
our future leaders. Other variables such as the number of hours spent playing video games, 
applicant birth order, or if chores were a required part of their household responsibilities 
growing up could all signal leadership qualities. Additionally, collecting data in areas to 
include how applicants paid for college such as scholarships, parental financial support, 
working as a resident assistant while attending school or whether the applicant worked 
their way through school, or determining how an applicant purchased and maintained their 
first car could signal leadership abilities. Increasing the data collected would reduce the 
need to utilize intelligence proxy variables, give future studies the ability to examine the 
true qualities the Marine Corps values in its officer corps, and provide sound 
recommendations to ensure the best applicants are being selected for service. 
Creating and collecting leadership quality metrics for new applicants would be a 
step in the right direction. However, it would be of little use for several years without data 
to compare it to. The Basic School (TBS) does a fantastic job of collecting quantifiable 
leadership data on lieutenants while they are attending its course, but the data may not 
translate to the officer selection process. Collecting such data from current Marine officers 
to include all ranks and performance levels would establish a baseline for comparison and 
place value on the quality metrics associated with high performing officers. I recommend 
developing data points of interest and collecting these same intangible leadership data 
points from current officers pre-Marine Corps experiences as a basis to establish what the 
Marine Corps defines as quality. While academic metrics are important in evaluating an 
applicant’s ability to perform, there may be other attributes that fit the Marine Corps’ 
definition of quality better than academic performance.  
Second, the impact of missing data in MCRISS highlights the limitations present 
when trying to analyze a problem or answer questions and provide insight. Based on how 
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selection boards are conducted, selection decisions are made based on numerous factors 
not captured in the data, making it difficult to analyze the true effects of these variables on 
the selection process and forcing researchers to utilize proxies. Additionally, selection 
board’s reliance on paper records and MCRISS data entry occurring separate from board 
proceedings leads to incomplete records and missing data. I recommend the Marine Corps 
switch to an all-electronic board submission database process in order to ensure all data 
points are collected and maintained electronically for board processes and future analysis’. 
Considering that selecting the right applicant for the right job could result in greater 
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